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REDRAWING THE BATTLE LINES IN THE WAR AGAINST SMUT:
FILTERWARE IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES AFTER Reno v. ACLU
Susan Roberts*
1. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ushered in a new era of
First Amendment jurisprudence with its landmark decision in Reno v. ACLUV and
tripped the trigger on a new round of lawsuits. At issue is the appropriate use of
a technology that both sides in Reno applauded in principle: user-based blocking
and filtering software. No one disputes that products like Cyber Patrol and Net
Nanny can help parents set boundaries for children's Internet use at home. The
trouble starts when public libraries use software to selectively block access for all
patrons.
Reno v. ACLU struck down parts of the Communications Decency Act of 19962
aimed at "protect[ing] minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' communi-
cations on the Internet."3 The Court held the Act to be a content-based regulation
of speech and invalidated the two challenged provisions as overbroad.' This Note
recounts the history of Reno v. ACLU, highlights the supporting case law, and
sets out the issues and arguments the Supreme Court considered. Finally, this
Note demonstrates why mandatory use of Internet blocking software in public
libraries is destined to fail.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996.' Most of the 103-page statute consisted of provisions
designed to promote competition among local providers of telephone service, as
well as in the multichannel video and the broadcasting markets.6 Title V of the
legislation was the notable exception.! Known as the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA or Act), this portion of the Telecommunications Act drew a
bead on minors' access to "'indecent' and 'patently offensive' communications
on the Internet."8
* The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Matthew Steffey's guidance and encouragement during the
development of this Casenote.
1. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-35 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223, originally enacted
as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1934).
3. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
4. Id. at 874.
5. Id. at 861.
6. Id. at 857-58.
7. Id. at 858.
8. Id. at 849.
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No sooner had the President signed the legislation than twenty plaintiffs9 filed
suit against Attorney General Janet Reno and the Department of Justice, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of two sections of the CDA.'" Section 223(a),
known as the "indecent transmission" provision, "prohibit[ed] the knowing trans-
mission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of
age.".1 Section 223(d), the "patently offensive display" provision, "prohibit[ed]
the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner
that is available to a person under 18 years of age."12 The plaintiffs argued that
these provisions would "ban[ ] a substantial category of protected speech from
most parts of the Internet.'" 3 One week after the original plaintiffs filed suit,
Judge Buckwalter of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered a temporary
restraining order against the government. 4 Twenty-seven more plaintiffs'" filed a
second suit, which was consolidated with the first."1
The CDA itself provided that challenges to the law be heard by a three-judge
district court panel, which held an evidentiary hearing and then entered a prelim-
inary injunction against enforcement of both challenged provisions." Although
the judgment was unanimous, Chief Judge Sloviter, Judge Buckwalter, and Judge
Dalzell each wrote separate opinions. 8 The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion
incorporated much of the district court's "extensive" findings of fact, as well as a
summary of each district judge's reasoning. 9
A. Chief Judge Sloviter
Chief Judge Sloviter first pointed out the statute's "criminal provisions, sub-
jecting violators to substantial penalties."2 She identified the CDA as "patently
9. The American Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Center;
Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global Communications;
Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory;
Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks
dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John Troyer dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle;
and Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F Supp. 824, 827 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
10. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.
II. Id. at 859.
12. Id.
13. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. The plaintiffs did not challenge the statute as it applied to obscenity or child
pornography, for which Internet speakers could already be prosecuted under existing law. See id. at 829.
14. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.
15. The American Library Association; America Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.;
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; American Society of Newspaper Editors; Apple
Computer, Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.; Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers;
Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition; Commercial Internet Exchange Association; CompuServe
Incorporated; Families Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences
Libraries Consortium; Hotwired Ventures LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Interactive Services
Association; Magazine Publishers ofAmerica; Microsoft Corporation; The Microsoft Network, L.L.C.;
National Press Photographers Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.; Newspaper
Association of America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of Professional Journalists; and
Wired Ventures, Ltd. See ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 827-28 n.3.
16. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861-62.
17. Id. at 862.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 849-64.
20. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 850.
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a government-imposed content-based regulation on speech" and noted that the
Constitution protects both "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech. 2'
Consequently, a strict scrutiny standard of review applied, requiring a compelling
government interest and a narrowly tailored statute to uphold the regulation as
constitutional .22
In response to the government's asserted interest in protecting minors, she
noted that no compelling interest had been shown in preventing seventeen-year-
olds from accessing such non-obscene material as "[p]hotographs appearing in
National Geographic or a travel magazine of the sculptures in India of couples
copulating in numerous positions, a written description of a brutal prison rape, or
Francesco Clemente's painting 'Labyrinth."' ' 3 Furthermore, she continued, tech-
nology did not exist to enable many Internet content providers to identify minors
who access their materials.' The Chief Judge compared the CDA to "the prover-
bial sword of Damocles" hovering over content providers who could be held crimi-
nally liable for miscalculating community standards or misjudging indecency.
2 5
Judge Sloviter then proceeded to dispose of the government's argument that
new technology would soon be available: "I can imagine few arguments less
likely to persuade a court to uphold a criminal statute than one that depends on
future technology to cabin the reach of the statute within constitutional
bounds."28 She treated in like manner the government's argument that the con-
cerns of the plaintiffs (and the court) were exaggerated and "that we should, in
effect, trust the Department of Justice to limit the CDA's application in a reason-
able fashion .... That would require a broad trust indeed from a generation of
judges not far removed from the attacks on James Joyce's Ulysses as obscene."'"
She concluded that the CDA was not narrowly tailored and that the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive" were vague. 8 Therefore, the challenged pro-
visions were facially invalid under both the First and Fifth Amendments. 9
B. Judge Buckwalter
Judge Buckwalter declared the statute overbroad." He then summarized his
concerns: (1) that the challenged provisions of the CDA violated both the First
and Fifth Amendments because of vagueness, and (2) that technology could not
yet provide a "safe harbor" for most Internet speakers." He agreed with Chief
Judge Sloviter that the statute failed a strict scrutiny analysis and was thus
unconstitutional.3 He analyzed the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" to
21. Id. at 851.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 853.
24. Id. at 855.
25. Id. at 855-56.
26. Id. at 857.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 856-57.
29. Id. at 857.
30. Id. at 858.
31. Id. at 859.
32. ld.
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support his premise that the "fundamental constitutional principle ... of simple
fairness .. is absent in the CDA."' Referring to the statute's reliance on "con-
temporary community standards," Judge Buckwalter questioned whether "the
contemporary community standards to be applied [were] those of the vast world
of cyberspace."3 ' Like Chief Judge Sloviter, he dismissed the government's argu-
ment that the court should trust prosecutors' judgment: "Such unfettered discre-
tion to prosecutors ... is precisely what due process does not allow."3 He also
acknowledged "the vagaries of politics. What may be, figuratively speaking, one
administration's pen may be another's sword."3
C. Judge Dalzell
Judge Dalzell wrote the most expansive of the three opinions, concluding that
"the First Amendment denies Congress the power to regulate protected speech on
the Internet." 7 He parted company with Judges Sloviter and Buckwalter, finding
that Congress intended "indecent" and "patently offensive" to be synonymous.
38
Furthermore, he concluded that the concept was not unconstitutionally vague.
3
1
However, since lack of technology rendered defenses unavailable, the effect of
the statute was a total ban on protected speech-an issue of overbreadth. '
Like the other two judges, he refuted the government's argument that the plain-
tiffs' claims were exaggerated: "[E]ven though it is perhaps unlikely that the
Carnegie Library will ever stand in the dock for putting its card catalog online, or
that the Government will hale the ACLU into court for its online quiz of the
seven dirty words, we cannot ignore that the Act could reach these activities.""1
Finally, borrowing a metaphor from Butler v. Michigan,42 Judge Dalzell pro-
claimed that "[a]ny content-based regulation of the Internet, no matter how
benign the purpose, could burn the global village to roast the pig."4 He charac-
terized the Internet as "a never-ending worldwide conversation [that t]he
Government may not, through the CDA, interrupt.""
D. Significance of the District Court Opinion
After its defeat at the district level, the government appealed to the United
States Supreme Court under the CDA's special review provisions. Not only did
the Supreme Court agree with the district court that the CDA "abridge[d] 'the
33. Id. at 861.
34. Id. at 863.
35. Id. at 864.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 872.
38. Id. at 868-69.
39. Id. at 869.
40. Id. at 870.
41. Id. at 871.
42. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
43. ACLU, 929 F Supp. at 882.
44. Id. at 883.
45. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
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freedom of speech' protected by the First Amendment,""' it also agreed with the
lower court's methodology in the case.
That methodology included 410 findings of fact 7 related to "the character and
the dimensions of the Internet, the availability of sexually explicit material in that
medium, and the problems confronting age verification for recipients of Internet
communications.""' The district court opinion included 123 paragraphs of those
findings," which the Supreme Court summarized and acknowledged as "the
underpinnings for the legal issues.""0 In addition to accepting the district court's
factual material, the Supreme Court also embraced the lower court's legal
analysis'---one that failed to resonate with the government's view of the case. 2
III. HISTORY OF THE LAW
The Supreme Court's historical approach to freedom of speech questions
includes two inquiries. One relates to the medium of the speech and the other to
its message.
A. The Message
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... -1 Those words from the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution have been subject to continuing judicial construction over the years,
so that there are, in fact, whole categories of speech that enjoy no First
Amendment protection.5' Obscenity is one kind of speech the First Amendment
does not protect.55
Sixteen years after the Supreme Court first grappled with the obscenity issue
in Roth v. United States, the Court finally settled on a standard in Miller v.
California."n The case appealed a conviction under California's obscenity law for
the mass mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit advertising brochures.5 7 The
obscenity test the Court set out in Miller contains three prongs:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."8
46. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 1).
47. Id. at 849 n.2.
48. Id. at 849.
49. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49.
50. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id. at 864.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
54. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech likely to incite imminent illegal action);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
55. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
56. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
57. Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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The constitutional waters get murky, though, for arguably objectionable speech
that does not meet the Miller test for obscenity. Such "indecent" speech is con-
stitutionally protected. 9 Even so, government may regulate indecent speech-
but that regulation "is subject to strict scrutiny, and will only be upheld if it is
justified by a compelling government interest and if it is narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest."'
As for what material is indecent, the Court has said that "the normal definition
of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of moral-
ity.""1 Also, "indecency is largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately
judged in the abstract." 2
Notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to plainly define indecency, at least two
cases provide guidance in the context of broadcast media.' Both involve defini-
tions formulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the
course of its regulatory responsibilities. The government's interest in both cases
was the protection of children.6
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation upheld an FCC declarative order that authorized
administrative sanctions for a radio station's mid-afternoon broadcast of an inde-
cent monologue. The Court quoted the Commission's memorandum opinion,
which identified indecency as "'the exposure of children to language that
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audi-
ence."'
66
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC upheld a
statutory provision that permitted cable television operators to decide whether to
broadcast indecent programs on channels leased to unaffiliated third parties.
The case also struck down another provision that required cable operators to seg-
regate and block sex-related material on leased channels.' The FCC defined
"indecency" in Denver Area as "descriptions or depictions of 'sexual or excreto-
ry activities or organs in a patently offensive manner' as measured by the cable
viewing community."6 " The petitioners in Denver Area argued that the FCC's
definition was too vague, but the Court sidestepped that issue, noting that the
definition "uses language similar to language previously used by this Court for
roughly similar purposes."7
59. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
60. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
61. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978).
62. Id. at 742. The word "pornography" has no fixed legal meaning; it may include materials that are either
indecent or obscene. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 866.
63. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
64. DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 733; Pacifica, 438 U.s. at 749-50.
65. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30, 738.
66. Id. at 731-32 (citation omitted).
67. DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 733.
68. Id. at 760.
69. Id. at 736.
70. Id. at 750-51.
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Pacifica and Denver Area implicitly assume that children cannot be separated
out of the audience. Hence, these cases support regulation of indecent speech
that also to some degree affects willing adult listeners, in spite of adults' full
First Amendment rights to hear such speech. But when minors can be segregat-
ed, a different-and lower-First Amendment standard applies to them."
Ginsberg v. New York upheld the conviction of a retailer who sold "girlie maga-
zines" to a sixteen-year-old boy.72 At issue was a New York obscenity law that
barred "the sale to minors under 17 years of age material defined to be obscene
on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults.""
The Court required only "that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.""'
The Court also has approved the use of zoning ordinances to regulate indecent
speech.7 Young v. American Mini Theatres upheld Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row
Ordinance" that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within 500 feet of
a residential area or within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" (includ-
ing bars, adult book stores, and eight other kinds of businesses). 6 City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie the-
aters within 1000 feet of residential areas, churches, parks, or schools."7 The pro-
fessed goal of the ordinances in both cases was to combat the "secondary
effects" of the theaters, including crime, prostitution, and declining property val-
ues."8 In both cases, the Court saw zoning ordinances as "'content neutral' time,
place, and manner regulations (that] are acceptable so long as they are designed
to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alter-
native avenues of communication.""
B. The Medium
1. Broadcast
Just as the Court has not treated all categories of speech the same, it has not
treated all forms of speech the same." Of all kinds of communication, broad-
casting has received the least First Amendment protection."1 The Court has given
two reasons that are particularly important to the indecency discussion. First,
broadcasting is uniquely pervasive in the lives of all Americans, so that even in
the privacy of their homes, listeners and viewers tuning in and out may acciden-
71. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
72. Id. at 633.
73. Id. at 63 1.
74. Id. at 641.
75. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
76. Young, 427 U.S. at 52, 54.
77. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
78. Young, 427 U.S. at 55; Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
79. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
80. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
81. Id.
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tally encounter objectionable material without warning.82 Second "broadcasting
is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read."'
Although the "pervasiveness" argument presumably applies to unwilling adult
listeners too, it was concern for children that justified "special treatment" of in-
decent broadcasting in Pacifica."4 The Court used the same reasoning in Denver
Area when it concluded that "[c]able television broadcasting.. . is as 'accessible
to children' as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so.""s This "accessibility"
justified giving cable operators the option of not broadcasting indecent program-
ming on leased access channels." It did not justify requiring operators to "segre-
gate and block" such material, because the Court found that less restrictive meth-
ods could protect children just as effectively.87
2. Telephone
The telephone is different from broadcast media as an avenue of indecent com-
munication." Sable Communications of California v. FCC invalidated a ban on
indecent telephone "dial-a-porn" messages in part because the telephone, unlike
radio in Pacifica, "requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication." 9 The medium eliminates the problem of unwilling listeners
surprised by an indecent message." The Court determined that there were less
restrictive ways "to serve the Government's compelling interest in protecting
children," including the use of credit cards, access codes, and scrambling rules. 1
The Court's history of applying different levels of First Amendment protection
to different forms of speech assumed critical importance for the resolution of
Reno v. ACLU. The Court either had to analogize the Internet to other media in
previous cases or declare the Internet a completely new species of communica-
tion with its own unique set of First Amendment rules.
IV. INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment concerning the CDA
on First Amendment grounds of overbreadth only.2 The Court specifically
declined to reach the Fifth Amendment issue of vagueness, but nonetheless dis-
cussed it in some depth in connection with the overbreadth inquiry. 3 The Court
also considered-and for the most part rejected-the government's contention
that the statute could be saved by its severability clause" and narrow construc-
tion of nonseverable terms.99
82. Id.
83. Id. at 749.
84. Id. at 750.
85. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996).
86. Id. at 733.
87. Id. at 756-60.
88. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
89. Jd. at 128.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997).
93. Id.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 608 (1994).
95. Reno, 521 U.S. at 882.
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Justice Stevens wrote the Supreme Court's seven-justice majority opinion in
Reno.98 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a separate
opinion that concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.9" This sec-
tion of the Note sets out the reasoning that the majority and the dissent used to
address the main issues of the case, as well as the arguments advanced by the
parties.
A. The Government' Arguments
The government contended that the CDA was constitutional under four earlier
cases in which the Supreme Court upheld time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech. 8 The government cited Ginsberg for the proposition that "there is no
First Amendment right to disseminate indecent material to children."9 It relied
on Pacifica to argue that "Congress could channel indecent communications to
places on the Internet where children are unlikely to obtain them." ' Finally, the
government invoked Renton and Young to assert that "[the CDA] operates as an
adult 'cyberzoning' restriction, very much like the adult theater zoning ordi-
nances."
101
In response to the vagueness challenge, the government argued that three prior
Supreme Court decisions "strongly support" the constitutionality of the CDA's
wording."0 2 The CDA's definition of indecency is similar to one prong of the
Miller obscenity test and one element of the Ginsberg harmful-to-minors defini-
tion; and it is "almost identical" to the indecency definition that survived a
vagueness challenge in Denver Area."0 3 The government also argued that
Congress intended the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" to be synony-
mous.0 4 "In other words, indecent is shorthand for patently offensive sexually
explicit communications, and the latter is the definition of the former."' 9
The government acknowledged that "in the short run" the CDA could encum-
ber constitutionally-protected indecent communication between adults. '1 ' Even
so, no less burdensome approach would vindicate the government's interest in
protecting children.0 7 Five arguments addressed why those burdens should not
signal overbreadth.
The CDA includes a scienter requirement, so that Internet speakers who use a
"telecommunications device" to transmit indecent materials "need only refrain
from disseminating such materials to persons they know to be under 18.'18
96. Id. at 849.
97. Id. at 886.
98. Brief forAppellants at 15-16, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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Likewise, the provision that prohibits using "an interactive computer service" to
send patently offensive materials "applies only to situations in which a person
sends indecent material to someone he knows to be under 18."'1 The govern-
ment denied that either provision prohibited such communication between
adults." '
The government argued that selective enforcement of the statute would mean
that "material having scientific, educational, or news value [would] almost
always fall[ ] outside the CDA's coverage.""' The statute's legislative history and
the "historical meaning of the CDA's indecency definition" pointed to this
result."'2
The statute provides defenses." 3 Those defenses include requiring a debit or
credit card or other age verification to access sexually explicit sites..' or other
"good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circum-
stances.""' Internet industry advances would flesh out details of these defenses;
"tagging" and blocking devices illustrated the kinds of "technological solutions
[that would] be created if the CDA's indecency restrictions are upheld.""'
Finally, the government asserted that "reasonable opportunities to disseminate
indecent material" would still exist under the CDA framework." 7 "Burdens and
costs" do not create a flat ban, nor is it necessary for "most speakers [to be] able
to communicate indecent speech over every possible Internet application.""' 8
The government's fall-back argument on the issue of overbreadth was the sev-
erability clause contained in the Communications Act of 1934 that the CDA
amended. "' The clause provides that "[i]f any provision of this chapter or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder
of the chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or circum-
stances shall not be affected thereby."'20 The government argued that the Court
could use this clause to sever any unconstitutional provision of the CDA and nar-
rowly construe the rest.' 2 '
B. Arguments of the ACLU, et al.
The ACLU urged the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the CDA based on two
arguments: (1) The CDA operates as "a criminal ban" on protected speech,
because Internet speakers cannot identify minors in their audiences; and (2) the
109. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 24-25.
Ill. Id. at 44.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id. at 34.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B) (Supp. 1996).
115. See id. § 223(e)(5)(A).
116. Brief for Appellants at 38, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
117. Id. at 39.
118. Id.
119. Id. at45.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 608 (1994).
121. Brief for Appellants at 45-47.
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statute regulates speech on the basis of content.122 To support these arguments,
the ACLU relied primarily on Denver Area, which invalidated a "segregate and
block" requirement for cable television channels;"' and on Sable, which struck
down a ban on indecent telephone messages."
The ACLU argued that the CDA could not withstand strict scrutiny. 25 The
defenses provided in the statute were unavailable to most Internet speakers,
either because of prohibitive cost or nonexistent technology.' 5 Therefore, the
statute was not narrowly tailored. 27 In addition, the CDA "does not directly and
materially advance the government's asserted interest in protecting minors"
because it cannot be enforced against Internet content that originates outside the
United States." 8 Moreover, more effective and less restrictive alternatives exist-
ed, including user-based blocking software, protections offered by commercial
online services, and standards under development by an industry coalition., "
The ACLU characterized the CDA as overbroad and maintained that the defect
could not be cured by narrow construction.'" Even if the statute were applied
only to commercial websites, such construction would violate the CDA's legisla-
tive purpose.131 Resort to the severability clause would turn the judiciary into
legislators.' 2 Finally, the overbreadth extends to material that is constitutionally
protected for minors and especially valuable to older adolescents, including
information on HIV/AIDS.'3
The ACLU pronounced the CDA fatally vague, particularly given the risk of
criminal penalties for violations. 3 First, it was unclear what material the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive" encompass."' Second, the statute "fail[ed]
to define the relevant 'community' that will set the standard for what is 'inde-
cent' on the global Internet." 36
C. The Majority Opinion
1. Similarities to the District Court Opinion
The district court opinion informed the high court's reasoning in several
respects. The Supreme Court devoted two of the first three sections of its opinion
to the disposition of the case in the court below."7 One section summarized the
122. Brief forAppellees at 21-22, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-51 I).
123. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760 (1996).
124. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
125. BriefforAppellees at 27.
126. Id. at 27-28.
127. Id. at 27.
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 39.
131. Id. at 40.
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 42.
135. Id. at 42-45.
136. Id. at 45.
137. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-64 (1997).
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district court's factual findings.'38 The other section highlighted the individual
opinions of Chief Judge Sloviter and Judges Buckwalter and Dalzell."'
The Court's own analysis mirrored that of the district court in important ways.
The Supreme Court agreed that the case demanded strict scrutiny, because "our
cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to this medium.' ' "W Those "cases" to which the Court referred
included three that the government urged as analogous-Ginsberg, Pacifica, and
Renton-which the Court rejected as inapposite."' The Court instead agreed
with the district court's focus on Sable, concluding that issues presented by "dial-
a-porn" telephone messages most closely resembled those raised by the CDA." 2
The Supreme Court's inquiries into vagueness and overbreadth also tracked
much of the district court's analysis," 3 even though the high court stopped short
of reaching the vagueness issue in its judgment.'"
2. Rejection of the Government's Time, Place, and Manner Argument
The Court rejected the government's contention that the CDA was a time,
place, and manner restriction and concluded instead that the statute was "a con-
tent-based blanket restriction on speech." ' One by one, the Court disposed of
the cases that the government offered in analogy.'
The Court noted that the statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the
CDA in four ways.'47 First, the Ginsberg statute did not prohibit parents from
buying their children sexually explicit magazines, whereas the CDA applied not-
withstanding parental consent or participation. '8 Second, the Ginsberg statute
applied only to commercial transactions; the CDA had no such restriction." 9
Third, the Ginsberg statute applied only to materials that were "'utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors.""'  The CDA omitted this qualifica-
tion. " ' Fourth, the Ginsberg statute defined persons younger than seventeen as
minors; the CDA applied to persons younger than eighteen.5 I
Similarly, the Court found significant differences between the CDA and
Pacifica.'53 The Pacifica order by the FCC targeted a particular broadcast "in
order to designate when-rather than whether-it would be permissible to air
such a program in that particular medium."'"" The order was declaratory, not
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139. Id. at 862-63.
140. Id. at 870.
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149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968)).
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punitive, and it was issued by an agency charged with regulatory responsi-
bilities. 5 Finally, the order applied to a medium-broadcast-that historically
had received limited protection under the First Amendment."'6 The Internet, on
the other hand, has no First Amendment history. ' Also, part of the original regu-
latory rationale for broadcast-the scarcity of frequencies---did not apply to a
medium offering "unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.""'
The Court also rejected the government's "cyberzoning" analogy to Renton and
Young.' 9 The CDA was different, according to the Court, for two reasons. First,
the CDA applied "to the entire universe of cyberspace."'l Second, the CDA was
designed to protect children from the primary effects of the proscribed speech,
not its secondary effects.6"
3. Vagueness
The CDA's vagueness concerned the Court for two reasons. First, as a content-
based regulation, its ambiguity chilled speech." Second, the possibility of crim-
inal sanctions increased the CDA's deterrent effect on "even arguably unlawful"
speech."5 3
The Court rejected the government's contention that the CDA's language was
no more vague than the obscenity standard in Miller.' First, the Miller prong at
issue applied only to depictions of "sexual conduct" and required that proscribed
material be "specifically defined by the applicable state law."1"5 In contrast, the
CDA reached "excretory activities," as well as sexual and excretory "organs";
and it included no state law reference to offset the inherent vagueness of "patent-
ly offensive" 6 Second, "Ujust because a definition including three limitations
is not vague, it does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is
not vague."'61 The Court noted particularly that the other two Miller prongs
"critically limit[ ] the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition."' 68
Consequently, the CDA presented a greater threat than Miller to speech that fell
outside its scope."
4. Overbreadth
The Court called the CDA's coverage "wholly unprecedented." 7' Its "broad
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indecent communications invalidated in Sable.'7' Like dialing a phone, accessing
the Internet "requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed"
than turning on a radio or television.' 2 Therefore, the chance of accidentally
encountering indecent material was remote.'73 In Sable, the Court rejected the
argument that only a total ban could prevent children from hearing indecent mes-
sages. 7' Likewise, the government would have to explain why a less burden-
some approach than the CDA would not protect children on the Internet-a
showing the government did not make. 7
The Court dismantled all arguments the government advanced against the over-
breadth challenge.' 6 First, the statute's scienter requirement could not overcome
the CDA's interference with adult communications.' 7 Because "most Internet
fora . . . are open to all comers," the knowledge requirement could confer a
"heckler's veto" on any person who logged on and claimed his child was
present.'78 Knowledge that one participant in a 100-person chat room was a
minor "would surely burden communication among adults."'1
Second, the Court found "no textual support" for the idea that educational or
other valuable material would fall outside the statute's reach.18° Third, the
statute's defenses were illusory, since current technology either did not support
them or made such defenses prohibitively expensive for most Internet speak-
ers.
81
Fourth, the government's time, place, and manner analysis was inapplicable to
a statute that regulated content. 2 Providing "a 'reasonable opportunity' for
speakers to engage in ... restricted speech on the World Wide Web ... is equiva-
lent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as indi-
viduals are free to publish books.""
Fifth, only one word-"indecent"---could be severed from the statute, and then
only from the section proscribing obscene communications. 8' Moreover, the
Court could not impose a narrow construction on the CDA, because its "open-
ended character... provide[d] no guidance whatever for limiting its coverage."'
' 85
In another reference to the Butler metaphor, the Court warned that the CDA
"threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the Internet community.""' Finally, the
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Court affirmed the district court judgment, concluding that "[t]he interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theo-
retical but unproven benefit of censorship.""1 7
D. The O'Connor and Rehnquist Dissent
The dissent saw the CDA as a law that conceivably could be-but was not-
constitutional.' 1 O'Connor, who wrote the opinion, conceptualized the CDA as
an Internet "zoning law."189 As such, it would be valid if (1) it did not "unduly
restrict" adult access to the indecent material it targeted; and (2) it did not violate
the First Amendment rights of minors to read or view the material.9 The CDA
failed the first prong of the dissent's test.'9 1
The CDA restricts adult access to protected speech. 9 2 O'Connor acknowl-
edged that cyberspace is "fundamentally different" from physical space, and that
"it is not currently possible to exclude persons from accessing certain messages
on the basis of their identity."'9 3 At the same time, the electronic world is "mal-
leable"; that is, "it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace."'94 Internet
speakers can require adult identification codes or credit card numbers, and
Internet listeners can screen for objectionable content-although technology
does not fully support either option today.' But since current technology did
not permit an Internet speaker to know that minors were not listening, the CDA
forced adults to refrain from indecent speech.9 8
Unlike the majority, the dissent would use the scienter provision to find the
CDA constitutional in certain narrowly-defined circumstances."7 This limited
application envisioned a conversation involving only one adult speaker who
knows that the recipients of the communication are minors.'98 Analogizing to the
law upheld in Ginsberg, O'Connor asserted that restricting adult speech in this
setting leaves adults free to speak indecently to each other.199 But the Ginsberg
analogy breaks down as soon as another adult enters the conversation."' In that
situation, the CDA was like "a law that makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to
sell pornographic magazines to anyone once a minor enters his store."2 '
The dissent found that the CDA satisfied the zoning test's second prong con-
cerning the right of minors to read or view indecent material." 2 O'Connor cited
Ginsberg's "harmful to minors" standard and noted that the CDA's "patently
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offensive" wording overshot the mark in two respects.0 3 The CDA banned
speech that had some redeeming value for minors and speech that did not appeal
to minors' prurient interest. 24 However, "the universe of speech constitutionally
protected as to minors but banned by the CDA ... is a very small one."2 5
Therefore, the statute was not substantially overbroad in this area. °
V ANALYSIS
A United States district court has already struck down one community's library
filtering policy on constitutional grounds.20 ' However, several states have passed
filtering laws, and legislation is pending in ten others." 8 Consequently, more liti-
gation seems likely.
Under Reno, mandatory use of Internet filtering software in public libraries
should be constitutionally invalid. The Court in Reno presumed that content reg-
ulation of Internet speech would interfere with, rather than encourage, the free
exchange of ideas .2 1 Whether the regulatory means is the CDA or mandatory
filtering, the outcome in the courtroom should be the same. Therefore, this sec-
tion of the Note examines the Reno-based arguments under which mandatory fil-
tering laws should be struck down.
A. Mandatory use of blocking software is subject to strict scrutiny as a content-
based regulation of speech.
The Court in Reno established a strict scrutiny standard of review for content-
based regulation of speech on the Internet.21 Blocking and filtering software
edit Internet speech based on content. Blocking software uses a "bad site" list to
deny users access to certain websites"' For example, one popular software pro-
gram uses "criteria [that] pertain to advocacy information: how to obtain inap-
propriate materials and or how to build, grow, or use said materials."2 '2 Filtering
software maintains a list of certain keywords such as "butt" and "sex" to block
sites containing those keywords. 3 A particular software program may use either
or both methods to edit Internet speech. 24 Therefore, laws mandating use of
blocking software in libraries actually mandate content-based regulation of Internet
speech. Consequently, such laws should be subject to strict scrutiny under Reno.
203. Id. at 895-96.
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206. Id. at 896-97.
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B. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest and a narrowly
tailored statute. Laws that mandate library use of blocking software fail strict
scrutiny because they are not narrowly tailored.
The Court ruled that the CDA was not narrowly tailored, because it "effectively
suppresse[d] a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and address to one another," including indecent speech." ' The Court in
this context noted the example of George Carlin's "seven dirty words" in the
Pacifica monologue. 15 Blocking and filtering software also ban speech that is
constitutionally protected for adults. In fact, blocking criteria could arguably
censor even more protected speech than the CDA's "indecent" and "patently
offensive" standard. Cyber Patrol, for example, specifically blocks "George
Carlin's 7 censored words ... intolerant jokes or slurs... advocacy of unlawful
political measures . . . [and] pictures or text advocating the proper use of contra-
ceptives."2" ' Consequently, because mandatory blocking of the Internet in public
libraries restricts such large amounts of adult speech, it is not narrowly tailored
and thereby fails strict scrutiny.
A blocking statute might be cured of this facial overbreadth by a provision for
disabling the software at adult request. Because the CDA could not be turned on
and off, Reno does not address this possibility-but Denver Area does.2 8 The
Court in Denver Area found that a provision requiring cable operators to "segre-
gate and block" indecent programming was not narrowly tailored to protect chil-
dren." Part of what the Court objected to in Denver Area was that subscribers
had to request access to the indecent channel in writing.22 The Court found that
"the 'written notice' requirement [would] further restrict viewing by subscribers
who fear for their reputations should the operator ... disclose the list of those
who wish to watch the 'patently offensive' channel."22' Therefore, a mandatory
blocking statute that included a provision for disabling upon written adult request
probably would still fail. Even a provision that required an oral request could be
troublesome under the reasoning of Denver Area, since other library patrons con-
ceivably could overhear the conversation.
C. Blocking criteria are so vague that a mandatory blocking law could silence
speech that is outside the scope of the software.
Although the Court in Reno did not reach the Fifth Amendment issue of vague-
ness in its judgment, it discussed the CDA's vagueness in relation to the over-
breadth inquiry.2 2 The Court concluded that "the vague contours of the coverage
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of the statute" meant that some speakers "unquestionably" would be silenced
even though their speech fell outside the statute's scope. 23
Whatever their ambiguity, the troublesome CDA terms "indecent" and "patent-
ly offensive" have their roots in case law.22' Consequently, the government was
able to at least argue their clarity on that basis."' In contrast, not only are soft-
ware blocking criteria not based in case law, the criteria differ from program to
program. For example: CYBERsitter uses "intelligent pattern recognition" to
block sites.2 ' Cyber Patrol blocks sites that fall into any of a dozen different
content-related categories, including violence/profanity, partial or full nudity,
gross depictions, satanic/cult, and others. 27 Surfwatch blocks five categories:
Sexually Explicit, Drugs/Alcohol, Gambling, Violence, and Hate Speech.228
Because there is no consistency from one product to the next, Internet speakers
have no way of knowing what the criteria are. On the margin, where content
would only arguably fall within the blocking criteria, speech not subject to block-
ing would be chilled. Consequently, vagueness would contribute to the over-
breadth of a mandatory library blocking statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfettered access to the Internet can be problematic for libraries. The
American Library Association (ALA) reports that some fifteen percent of
libraries that offer Internet access have installed filtering software,229 notwith-
standing an ALA resolution against blocking.23 Still, embattled librarians may
have other options besides the mandatory software solution.
The ACLU has suggested a variety of strategies, including "content-neutral
time limits" on Internet use and privacy screens to protect both Internet users and
passersby. 3' It is also possible that limited and judicious use of filtering soft-
ware could withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, the Austin, Texas,
library system plans to maintain at least one unfiltered computer at each
branch.232 Meanwhile, the Boston Public Library limited installation of filtering
programs to computers in children's areas.233
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No one knows whether these kinds of compromises could survive a court chal-
lenge. Conceivably, they could be valid as less restrictive alternatives to manda-
tory filtering-or not. Time and the legal system will tell. A surer bet under
Reno is that mandatory blocking will fail.

